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The Federal Aviation Administration has issued a moratorium on the use of 
wireless technologies connecting to its internal IT infrastructure.  Although, FAA 
employees would be able to take advantage of increased functionality and productivity 
provided by wireless connectivity, the FAA intends to develop a plan of action for 
securely rolling out wireless technology in its IT environment.   
Wireless LAN (WLAN) technology is a fast growing field.  Wireless networking 
provides an unparalleled mobility and freedom to users.  In the past few years wireless 
technology has expanded into a “hotspot” custom.  “Hotspots are public spaces like 
airports, hotel lunges, or cares, where people can log onto the Internet.” [1] In addition, 
major computer laptop manufacturers such as Intel and Dell are offering IEEE 802.11 
products. [1, 2] It is obvious that people desire, and are increasingly utilizing, wireless 
technology.   
Just as past computer improvements lead to the proliferation of home computing 
and the Internet, technical innovations coupled with the dropping costs of wireless-
capable devices are leading to greater utilization of wireless technology.  Although 
common WLAN clients today use laptops with PC cards “new technology innovations – 
smaller, lighter, and less power-hungry – are extending WLAN capabilities to PDAs, cell 
phone, and other mobile devices.” [3] The future of wireless devices seems limitless.   
What's more, wireless technology is alluring to both the commercial and personal 
business markets.  Wireless technology offers many tangible and intangible benefits to an 
existing network infrastructure with little financial outlay required for utilization.  
Convenience and productivity savings are key factors in the explosion of wireless 
products today.  For example, a business or home office with wireless equipment requires 
minimal wiring, or rewiring for furniture repositioning, thus alleviating cost and 
recovering productivity time lost in the past to personnel relocations.  The flexibility and 
ease of use for wireless technology within home and business environments is likely to 
only increase. [3]    
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Although the benefits to wireless technology are great, wireless equipment also 
brings an entirely new technology to the existing networking paradigm.  Over the years, 
wired networking has prompted the evolution of many security practices to prevent 
unlawful or accidental information exposure.  Yet, due to its nature, wireless technology 
exposes a realm of vulnerabilities not previously observed in wired networks.  Thus, 
wireless technology requires security measures in addition to the existing wired network 
security models.  These additional security measures must be factored into the overall 
wireless installation costs.  The gravity of security risks introduced by wireless 
technology has resulted in a FAA moratorium on wireless use within its jurisdiction.  
Wireless security concerns can never be removed completely but there are ways 
to greatly mitigate their shortcomings.  First, wireless technology requires a stronger 
network security policy than is necessary for wired networks.  Second, the organization 
must maintain highly trained IT security personnel with an understanding of wireless 
technology and security mechanisms required to protect against attacks.  Third, all 
individuals of an organization must be taught about the security policy in order to 
diminish accidental wireless mistakes.   And, most important, the policy must be enforced 
through consistent IT Department practices that maintain a level of confidence that policy 
is being adhered to by all personnel within the jurisdiction.  
This report presents security information specific to wireless technology and 
general recommendations the FAA can follow in order to securely transition to the use of 
wireless technology.  To establish a context for the recommendation, we first offer a brief 
overview of current wireless networking technologies and their security mechanisms 
provided by the IEEE 802.11 standards.  The recommendation is presented in three 
phases.  First, a case study of the Naval Postgraduate School’s recent secure transition to 
wireless is described.  This study provides lessons learned regarding the NPS effort to 
integrate wireless connectivity into its IT technologies.  The second phase provides a 
survey and analysis of a subset of the FAA IT infrastructure, and of FAA goals for 
wireless connectivity.  In the third phase the lessons learned from the case study form the 
basis for recommendations for wireless integrations into the FAA IT infrastructure.   
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The major goal of this report is to provide a high level recommendation for a 
wireless roll-out plan and wireless policy to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
by conducting a case study of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) wireless 
implementation plan.  The FAA is interested in the Naval Postgraduate School’s wireless 
roll-out experience and in the NPS lessons learned since the initial implementation of its 
wireless technology.   The methods used to secure the NPS wireless network in 
accordance with local wireless policy and DoD Wireless Policy are of particular interest.   
This report starts with general information about wireless technology including 
the different wireless standards and security measures needed to protect the entire 
network from its wireless components.  The report then focuses on the roll-out of 
campus-wide wireless technology at NPS and the subsequent lessons learned.  Based on 
the study of the NPS experience and of the FAA IT infrastructure, it concludes with 
recommendations to the FAA regarding its wireless policy, and for planning and roll out 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides an overview of the IEEE 802.11 architectural standard, 
associated wireless security concepts, WLAN security weaknesses and associated 
mitigation techniques, and also includes an example design for a wireless LAN.  This 
discussion is not a comprehensive description of IEEE 802.11 standard, but offers some 
background to assist with the decision making process.   
A. Introduction to IEEE 802.11 
In 1997, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) ratified the 
initial 802.11 standard.  IEEE 802.11 standard defines the interface between a mobile 
host device and an access point (AP) within a wireless network.  Figure II-1 displays the 
IEEE 802.11 standard in relation to the Physical and Data Link layers within the Open 
System Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model.  The 802.11 standard involves the 
Physical layer and only a portion of the Data Link layer known as the Medium Access 
Control (MAC).  The Data Link layer is split into two functional areas, the MAC and the 
Logical Link Control (LLC).  The LLC is covered within the IEEE 802.2 standard. The 
LLC standard is capable of supporting several MAC options as depicted in Figure II-1.    
 
Figure II-1 OSI Model and IEEE 802.11 [4] 
 
The Medium Access Control (MAC) Layer provides a variety of functions that 
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function of the MAC Layer is to hide the unreliability of RF communication from the 
upper layers of the OSI mode.  In a sense it manages and maintains communications 
between the mobile device network cards and APs by coordinating access to a shared RF 
channel and utilizing protocols to enhance both bursty and periodic communications over 
the wireless medium.   Periodic communications are described as having a relatively 
constant amount of traffic over a long period where the bursty is described as having 
intermittent periods of large traffic amounts.  It is important for wireless communication 
equipment to be a solution for both types of traffic.   
There are several distinctive mechanisms established within the MAC Layer to 
manage the nuances of wireless communications.  The discussion here is greatly 
simplified.  A main concept within MAC is a coordination function that determines 
within a wireless channel when a station is permitted to transmit and receive data via the 
wireless medium.  Each station on a wireless channel is given a transmission opportunity, 
a period of time that station has the chance to transmit on the wireless medium.  Usually 
co-located with an AP, a point coordinator generates and transmits beacon frames at 
regular intervals.  These beacon frames are sent for station synchronization and protocol 
information.   
The 802.11 MAC Layer basic access mechanism is carrier sense multiple access 
with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) with exponential back off.  In other words each 
wireless device senses whether or not the channel it communicates on is busy, if it is busy 
and the device waits a random period of time before sensing again.  If the channel is not 
busy it transmits the data.  Since the wireless medium is not as reliable as over wire, 
collision avoidance (CA) is utilized instead of collision detection.  The exponential back 
off refers to the process used after a transmission was unsuccessful.  In exponential back 
off, the random period of time before sensing for retransmission is selected out of a 
window of time that is doubled each time the channel is detected to be busy.   It prevents 
a situation where many hosts overload the channel during bursty traffic with many 
collisions.   
The Physical layer is responsible for the physical transportation of the bits 
between adjacent systems over the RF channel, in other words between the portable or 
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mobile device and AP or between two portable or mobile devices.  The protocol data unit 
for the physical layer consists of a preamble and a header, followed by the MAC data 
description abbreviated above.  The header will be used by the receiver for detection and 
synchronization.  When an AP has variable communications speeds the header will be 
sent at the slowest data rate to ensure furthest distance with propagation.   
Initial design of the 802.11 depicts the physical layer transmitting in direct 
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), or 
infrared (IR) and with a transmission rate of either 1 Mbps or 2 Mbps in the 2.4 GHz 
frequencies bandwidth.  Before completion of the first standard it was evident that the 
bandwidth was unacceptable for use in the growing market.  Of these original designs 
DSSS remains common within the 802.11 hardware today.    
To modify the actual data from digital to RF waveforms for radio transfer, signal 
processing is needed.  The signal processing steps performed are scrambling, spreading, 
and modulation.  Figure II-2 Simple Illustration of Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrumdepicts a simple illustration of the process.  Processing creates a resulting signal 
bandwidth of 22 MHz.  Taking into consideration guard bands there are three distinct 
non-overlapping 22 MHz channels within the 2.4 - 2.4835 GHz range.  The channels are 
centered at 2.412 GHz, 2.437 GHz, and 2.462 GHz as shown in Figure II-3.  Although 
the maximum power allowed for transmissions is 1 Watt, many vendors have opted for a 
default 0.1 Watts as the transmit power level.  The 802.11 WLAN enhancements 
associated with the OSI Physical layer are broken out in the next section.  
 




Three non-overlapping channels in 2.4 – GHz band (20MHz Wide)
CH 1 CH 11CH 6
DSSS
 
Figure II-3 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum channel description [6] 
The modulation supported in the original standard was differential phase-shift 
keying.  The physical layer information uses differential binary phase shift keying 
(DBPSK) at 1 Mbps, the MAC information is sent using differential quadrature phase 
shift keying (DQPSK) for 2 Mbps.  The binary phase shift uses no phase change for 0 and 
for 1 it uses a phase change of 180.  A quadrature phase shift doubles the throughput by 
encoding 00 as no phase shift, 01 as 90 degree shift, 10 as 180 degree shift, and 11 as 270 
degree shift.  Enhancements to DSSS through new modulation techniques as well as the 
introduction of another physical layer design, orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
(OFDM), is discussed in the next section, WLAN Standards. [7]  
 
B. IEEE 802.11 WLAN Standards 
It is important to remember that the 802.11 standard is work in progress.  In the 
end, the commercial acceptance of any standard lies in the ability of manufacturers to 
provide equipment meeting the standard’s objectives at a reasonable price and with ease 
of use to appeal to the consumer.  Several individual groups within IEEE 802.11 have 
formed to focus on specific technologies within the general wireless standard.  Each 
group, differentiated by a separate trailing letter, offers enhancements to the standard and 
protocol variations to support conformity issues.  At a high description level these groups 
concentrate on the physical layer, security, and quality of services.  Several vital 
standards within the 802.11 and the work of other still active groups are briefly discussed 
next in order to offer more clarity regarding the present status of wireless technology.  
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1. IEEE 802.11b 
This is a physical layer enhancement.  There are a large number of 
products on the market place today that meet this standard.  Since it utilizes the initial 
802.11 direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) technology and operates over the initial 
2.4 to 2.4835 GHz frequency range it is discussed first.   
In September 1999, the IEEE ratified the specification for IEEE 802.11b 
as an upgrade to the original 802.11.  This standard increases the throughput from the 
original standard of 1 - 2 Mbps up to 5.5 - 11Mbps.  The increase in throughput is due to 
the difference in modulation utilized.  As described above, the older version utilized 
DBPSK and DQPSK.  The newer 802.11b technology utilizes complementary code 
keying (CCK).  CCK is a variation of an orthogonal keying modulation.  The spreading is 
achieved by a spreading code with eight samples, each 8 chips obtained by using a 
quadrature phase shift key.   
Today the four possible type modulations used and their associated data 
rates are: DBPSK for 1 Mbps, DQPSK for 2 Mbps, and CCK for both 5.5 Mbps and 11 
Mbps.  In place of CCK, packet binary convolutional coding (PBCC) can be utilized.  It 
maintains the same 5.5 Mbps using bit to symbol mapping in binary phase shift key and 
11 Mbps using bit to symbol mapping in quadrature phase shift key.  After mapped 
through BPSK or QPSK the output goes through a cover sequence process before 
transmission.   
The common range of operation for 802.11b is 150 feet for a floor divided 
into individual offices by concrete or sheet-rock, about 300 feet in semi-open indoor 
spaces such as offices partitioned into individual workspaces, and about 1000 feet in 
large open indoor areas.  Disadvantages of 802.11b include interference from electronic 
products such as cordless phones and microwave ovens. [7] 
2. IEEE 802.11a / IEEE 802.11h 
This is also a physical layer enhancement.  IEEE 802.11a provides 
significantly higher performance than 802.11b, at 54 Mbps.  Unlike 802.11b, the 802.11a 
standard operates within the frequency range of 5.47 to 5.725 GHz and is not subject to 
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the same interference from other commercial electronic products.  This higher frequency 
band allows significantly higher speeds of communication over the 2.4 GHz range.   
802.11a technology utilizes orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
(OFDM) instead of DSSS as in the 802.11b.  In essence, OFDM process begins by 
splitting the input data into several parallel streams as shown in Figure II-4.  Each of the 
steams of data is then modulated onto a separate carrier frequency.  These individual 
carrier frequencies are transmitted in parallel as narrow subchannels.  At the far end the 
subchannels are demodulated and recombined into a replica of the original input data.  A 
spread spectrum technique is utilized to modulate each of the data streams onto the 
carrier frequencies.  Because of their orthogonality the channels are overlapped, allowing 
greater efficiency.  The orthogonal quality also allows for straightforward restructuring at 
the 802.11a receiver end. 
 
Figure II-4 OFDM Channels [6] 
Disadvantages to OFDM include, 802.11a is not backward compatible 
with the 802.11b.  Due to the higher frequency band the APs offer a smaller propagation 
coverage diameter, covering only about a quarter of the area of an 802.11b AP.  Some 
802.11a devices have a range of only 60 feet. The higher radio frequency also affects the 
coverage achievement making it more susceptible to walls and other environmental 
factors.  Also, equipment for 802.11a is in general more expensive than for 802.11b.  
Today, commercially available APs can be purchased that transmit in both frequency 
ranges for forward compatibility with the 802.11g, but the cost is significantly higher 
than the 802.11a AP.   
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802.11h is a recently completed amendment to 802.11a that defines how 
802.11a devices implement dynamic frequency selection (DFS) and transmitter power 
control (TPC).  This was necessary to satisfy European regulations for 5 GHz band 
devices to implement DFS and TPC.  Another reason for the amendment was 
compatibility with satellite communication systems and radars, the primary users of the 
Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) frequency band, of which the 
802.11a is located within.  The satellite and radar systems have the “right of way” 
requiring 802.11a owners to periodically test for the presence of radars and when 
detected must vacate the channel and transfer to another. [7]   
 
3. IEEE 802.11g 
Again, this is a physical layer enhancement.  This standard was begun 
shortly after 802.11b and 802.11a were completed.  The 802.11g has a performance 
capability of 54 Mbps similar to the 802.11a.  Today 802.11g proprietary products can be 
purchased that support 108Mbps between the AP and host station.  802.11g operates 
within the 2.4 to 2.4835 GHz frequency range as the 802.11b standard.  There are one 
mandatory and two optional physical layer mechanisms within the 802.11g.  The 
mandatory mechanism is OFDM just as described with the 802.11a standard.  In principle 
there are very few differences between the OFDM 802.11a and 802.11g.  One difference 
is that the time required to complete the convolutional decoding of the OFDM is greater 
with the 802.11a.  Therefore, the 802.11g is given an extra time period to equalize the 
two standards.   
802.11g supports many different data rates.  OFDM uses 6, 12, 24, 18, 36, 
and 54 Mbps.  The optional CCK-OFDM provides the rates of 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 
and 54 Mbps.  The optional PBCC provides the rates of 22 and 33 Mbps.  The selection 
of data rates is not specified within the standard and instead is left to the interpretation of 
the manufacturers.   
802.11g APs are backward compatible with 802.11b APs.  This backward 
compatibility with 802.11b is handled through the MAC layer, not the physical layer.  On 
the negative side, because 802.11g operates at the same frequency as 802.11b, it is 
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subject to the same interferences from electronic devices such as cordless phones.   Since 
the standard’s approval in June 2003, 802.11g products are gaining momentum and will 
most likely become as widespread as 802.11b products.  Table II-1 displays basic 
802.11b/a/g characteristics. [7]  
4. IEEE 802.11b/a/g: Original Security Characteristics 
This section describes the security mechanisms included within the 
original 802.11b/a/g standards.  In order to describe the security it is important to 
understand the basic concept behind a wireless connection.  All wireless connection 
devices require hardware to support basic service sets (BSS).  The BSS is the basic 
(wireless) network between two points: the host station and the Access Point (AP).  The 
term host station will be used here to describe a host computer within a wireless network.  
Access Points (AP) are responsible for acquiring the wireless signal from the host station 
wireless device and managing traffic between the host station and the network it is wired 
to.  In reality, the AP is connected to two networks simultaneously, the BSS with the host 
station(s) and the network it is attached to.  Wireless APs require additional hardware and 
software compared to the host station wireless devices in order to support traffic 





Freq Range Band Technology Backward 
Compatible: 
802.11b 1 to 11Mb/s 2.4-2.4835 GHz ISM DSSS  
802.11a 54Mb/s 5.47-5.725 GHz U-NII OFDM  
802.11g 54Mb/s 2.4-2.4835 GHz ISM OFDM (mandatory) 802.11a* 
802.11g 54Mb/s 2.4-2.4835 GHz ISM DSSS-OFDM 802.11b 
802.11g 33Mb/s 2.4-2.4835 GHz ISM PBCC  
*compatible if AP broadcasts in both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ranges. 
Table II-1 Comparison of 802.11b/a/g [7] 
Scanning, authentication and association must take place in order to 
establish a wireless connection and exchange data.  APs periodically transmit frames 
containing timing and network information that offer host stations the information they 
need to synchronize with an AP.  The host station scans to discover BSSs available 
within their proximity.  The host station then must authenticate to the AP.  Authentication 
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verifies the host station’s authorization to utilize the network through a difficult, but 
solvable security problem.  The association is established after the host station has been 
authenticated.  Data exchange occurs only after association is completed.  
Ad Hoc and Infrastructure Modes 
IEEE 802.11 defines two operating modes, ad hoc and infrastructure.  In 
ad hoc mode, wireless clients correspond with each other directly without the use of a 
wireless AP.  The wireless clients Network Interface Card (NIC) must be explicitly 
configured to use ad hoc mode.  Note that a similar protocol standard, known as 
Bluetooth, is used for interconnection of personal digital assistants (PDA), cell phones 
and computers, operates in ad hoc mode.  Dissimilar to ad hoc, infrastructure mode 
requires a wireless AP for all communications.  The wireless client must communicate 
with the wireless AP in order to gain access to the resources of a wired network as well as 
the other hosts located on the wireless segment.  
Authentication 
Once the BSS is discovered, authentication must be completed before a 
connection can occur.  Positive authentication leads to association, by which the host 
station becomes a member of the network.  Note that if the host station is configured for 
ad hoc operation it can connect directly with other host stations configured similarly.  If 
the host station is configured for infrastructure operation it requires connection to an 
available wireless AP.   
The initial 802.11 1997 standard defined three types of authentication: 
open system, shared key, and upper layer.  Although upper layer authentication is defined 
in the initial 802.11 standard, it is not offered within the original 802.11 security 
mechanisms.  The open system operates on a two message exchange.  The first message 
asserts identity and requests identity of the other party.  The second message returns the 
result, success or failure.  It trusts anyone, therefore, in practice it is not truly a security 
mechanism.  Shared key authentication offers more.   
The basic premise of shared key authentication is that each station 
requiring the connection must have a pre-shared secret key.  In other words the key the 
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client uses for authentication and encryption of the data stream must be the same key that 
the AP uses.  This equates to a symmetric as opposed to an asymmetric cipher key.  In 
addition, this secret, symmetric key must be exchanged over a separate secure method in 
practice.  The authentication challenge request is encrypted by the requesting end.  At the 
receiving end the message is decrypted and, if it matches, then the key is accepted as the 
same and authentication is successful and association is established between the AP and 
host station.   
On the other hand, there are several major disadvantages to shared key 
that have come to light since the original 802.11 was developed.  Authentication is only 
one way: host to AP.  In other words, genuine APs have some level of certainty that the 
hosts are authentic, but the hosts could unknowingly be associated to an AP that is not 
associated with the anticipated network.  There is no key management associated with the 
original 802.11, and given U.S. government regulations for exporting technology the 
mandatory key size (when enabled) is held to a 40-bit size static key.  A key is only 
secure as long as it has not been compromised and the static key requires regular and 
deliberate reconfiguration of host stations and wireless APs.  If the key is compromised 
the network is left open to unauthorized users.  In addition to this, all of the information 
required to construct a specific secret key can be found within the public domain of the 
network.  802.11i offers methods for wireless security that far surpass the original 802.11 
standard.  The next section covers 802.11i enhancements.   
Tying theory into wireless hardware practice, the authentication methods 
introduced above utilize service set identifiers (SSID) and wired equivalent privacy 
(WEP).  SSID operates as the open system portion of the authentication.  Hosts are 
required to provide the name of the network SSID in their client settings in order to be 
allowed access to that specific AP.  Newer 802.11 APs can be configured so they do not 
broadcast the SSID, but, by default APs broadcast the SSID.  If an AP broadcasts its 
SSID, any client can detect the SSID through its own wireless hardware/software.  WEP 
provides the shared key encryption and authentication for wireless communications.  The 




WEP encryption is based on the stream cipher RC4 algorithm.  The per-
packet key is a combination of the private (shared) key and the random initialization 
vector (IV).  The IV is a 24-bit field, which produces a 64-bit field when combined with 
the 40-bit key. The IV is created new for each packet but the private key remains the 
same.  During the encryption process the new per-packet key is XORed with the 
plaintext.  The decryption process is the reverse of this process.  WEP does not offer data 
integrity keys.  WEP can be configured to have an integrity check value (ICV) field 
within the plaintext, though.  The ICV provides a 32-bit cyclical redundancy check 
(CRC) for each data frame sent. The result from the ICV is added to the end of each data 
frame. 
WEP is particularly sensitive to passive attack.  Due to the small key size 
of 40-bits a passive attacker can gain the private key information through a small amount 
of statistical analysis.  An attacker can also create the data required to crack the key by 
sending text to another host station and then waiting to grab the cipher-text and compare 
to the original plain text message to discover the private key.  Hence, WEP only provides 
security against casual monitoring.  802.11i and WPA were initiated to create more 
security for the 802.11 standards. [7]  
5. IEEE 802.11i and Wireless Protected Access (WPA): Security 
Enhancements 
The intent of the 802.11i is to offer security characteristics that correct 
vulnerabilities discovered over the years within the original 802.11 standard and to create 
a robust security network (RSN).  The 802.11i standard was approved in June 2004 but 
has only partially migrated to consumer products through the actions of a related group 
known as the Wi-Fi Alliance.  The Wi-Fi Alliance took action before the 802.11i 
standard was completed in order to address the most serious shortcomings of WEP, 
including weak encryption, small key lengths and lack of key distribution and 
management methods.  Working closely with the 802.11i team the Wi-Fi Alliance 
developed an interim solution known as the WPA standard, released in late 2002.  Note 
that the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is a subset of 802.11i and has recently been 
updated to reflect the official 802.11i release.   
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In general, IEEE 802.11i can be separated into two broad categories: those 
mechanisms that have hardware available commercially today, and futuristic mechanisms 
that require development of new wireless hardware offering the greatest security.  
802.11i/WPA contains mutual authentication between the host station and AP in place of 
the original standard offering only one way authentication from host to the AP.  The 
authentication is managed through upper layer security mechanisms instead of the shared 
key technology discussed earlier from the original 802.11 standard.  In addition, the same 
key management algorithms are included within 802.11i and WPA, dynamic keys that are 
periodically refreshed as an alternative to the original 802.11 standard of static keys.   
The 2002 WPA standard focused on enhancing WEP through use of the 
temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP).  IEEE 802.11i includes this TKIP as an optional 
but preferably temporary solution.  Note that the TKIP is similar to the original WEP in 
that it utilizes the RC4 algorithm.  Some equipment is available today under the “WI-FI” 
standard logo that supports the TKIP solution.  This mechanism has been offered as the 
interim solution to major WEP shortcomings.   
The more secure encapsulation mechanism developed through 
802.11i/WPA is known as counter mode, cipher-block-chaining message authentication 
code protocol (CCMP).  CCMP is enhanced from the stream cipher of the original 802.11 
standard, but uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) instead of RC4.  This 
technology is presently unavailable on the commercial market, but no doubt will shortly 
make an appearance.   
Authentication: Upper Layer Functions 
The 802.11i/WPA standard introduces upper layer functions through three 
components that are located outside the original standard itself.  They are the IEEE 
802.1X Port, the Authentication Agent (AA), and the Authentication Server (AS), as 
shown in Figure II-5 802.11i/WPA Basics.  Note by using an 802.1X Port, the 802.11i 
utilizes the 802.1X standard for authentication and technically falls outside the 802.11 
which is only a physical and MAC layer standard.  802.1X provides both authentication 
and key management.  A wireless system deploying this upper layer suite is normally 
identified as a Wireless Protected Access (WPA) network.   
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Figure II-5 802.11i/WPA Basics [7] 
The 802.1X Port resides directly above the MAC layer of the 802.11.  All 
traffic going through the MAC goes through the 802.1X Port.  The second component, 
the AA resides above the 802.1X Port on each host station and within the AS on the 
network.  The AA provides for authentication and key management utilizing protocols 
above the 802.11 and 802.1X to provide its services.  The third component, the AS, 
resides within the network that participates in the authentication of all wireless host 
stations and APs.  The AS communicates with the AA on each host station and the AP 
providing the information every station requires to authenticate every other station.  
Together these components determine when to allow traffic across an 802.11 wireless 
link as described next.   
802.1X is a standard specifically developed for port-based network access 
control.  It is based on the extensible authentication protocol (EAP).  EAP is defined by 
RFC 2284 [8].  The EAP method describes three entities within the wireless network: 
supplicant, authenticator, and authentication server (AS) as described in Figure II-6 
802.1X Basics.  The 802.1X port within a system will be either a supplicant or 
authenticator.  Any port established for access to network services takes on the supplicant 
role.  The port allowing services to be accessed takes on the authenticator role.  The 
authenticator utilizes the AS, which performs the actual authentication function.  Note as 
stated above it is actually the AA of each supplicant and authenticator that communicates 
with the AS by exchanging EAP messages.  In order to provide robust security the 
requirement is that both supplicant and authenticator authenticate each other before 
association and actual communication begins.  Note that the AS may be co-located within 
the same system as the authenticator or it may be an external server.   
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Figure II-6 802.1X Basics [7] 
802.11i does not specify that EAP is mandatory.  But, it is specified that 
the chosen 802.1X protocol must support an authentication algorithm that performs 
mutual authentication and key management based on the authentication.  There are 
several 802.1X extensible authentication protocols used in commercial products.  The 
following is a brief description of the four commonly used EAP methods:   
• EAP-MD5 relies on and MD5 hash to pass authentication information for 
username and password to the RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User 
Server/Service) as the Authentication server.  Since EAP-MD5 offers no other 
features over the standard IEEE 802.1X, EAP-MD5 is considered the least secure 
of all the common EAP standards.  EAP-MD5 offers no key management or 
dynamic WEP key generation.     
• LEAP (Lightweight EAP) is a proprietary standard developed by CISCO to be 
used in conjunction with 802.1X.  LEAP accepts the username and password from 
the wireless client and transmits them to the RADIUS as the authentication server.  
LEAP conducts mutual authentication between the client and the server.  LEAP 
also generates a unique WEP key for each client.  Also LEAP requires the client 
to periodically log in for prevention of replay attacks. 
• EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security) outlined in RFC 2716 [9] defines the use of 
X.509, certificates to handle authentication.  EAP-TLS relies on security in the 
transport layer to pass Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) information to EAP.  EAP-
TLS supports mutual authentication and generates dynamic one-time WEP key.   
• EAP-TTLS (Tunnel TLS) is a proprietary product developed by FUNK 
SOFTWARE as an alternative for EAP-TLS.  EAP-TTLS requires the user to 
provide username and password.  The server authenticates to the user by 
certificates similar to EAP-TLS. [10]  
In comparison with the 802.11i, the WPA standard more specifically delineates 
the incorporation of the 802.1X with the EAP protocol and specifies Radius technology 
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as the authentication server.  RADIUS is a protocol that uses UDP packets to carry 
authentication and configuration information between the network access server (NAS) 
and the RADIUS Server. The authentication is based on the username, password, and, 
optionally, challenge-response. If the authentication is successful, the RADIUS server 
sends configuration information to the client.  There are multiple RADIUS 
implementations including freeware as well as vendor-specific.   
  
Figure II-3 displays the sequence of events that occur when a wireless 
client authenticates using 802.1X EAP-TLS.  Two digital certificates are exchanged: one 
for the RADIUS server and one for the wireless client.  The authenticator denies the 
wireless client access to network until authentication has succeeded and dynamic WEP 
keys have been established. [10] 
Privacy 
A message integrity code (MIC) introduced though the 802.11i/WPA 
standard is a data authenticity mechanism that proves more effective than the integrity 
check value (ICV) within the original 802.11 standard.  The MIC is used within both 
temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP) and counter-cipher-block chaining medium 
access control protocol (CCMP).  The MIC is a tag computed using a keyed 
cryptographic function.  This tag is transported over an unprotected channel with the data 
it is associated with.  The receiver verifies its value using the same key and cryptographic 
function used to encode it.  The MIC is susceptible to brute force attacks, so each MIC 
failure is assumed to be an attack.  The host station and AP are required to re-key after 
the first attack.  Any station, host station or AP will stop all communications for 60 
seconds on a second attack.   
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Figure II-3 802.1X Authentication Process [11] 
Figure II-3 illustrates the steps described below: 
cWireless client Association—this is the start of the EAP exchange.  Wireless client 
access is blocked until the client is authenticated.  Server requests identity of client. 
dThe wireless client sends the certificate to the server.  The server verifies the client 
certificate for validity. The client requests identity of server. 
eThe server sends the certificate to the wireless client.  Wireless client verifies the server 
certificates. 
fThe server notifies the AP to either allow the client to connect into the network or deny 
the wireless client connection.  If the client is allowed connection, a dynamic WEP key is 
generated and sent to the wireless client for encryption. [11] 
TKIP was specifically designed for existing hardware devices supporting 
WEP.  When utilized, TKIP elevates the privacy of an existing WEP wireless system.  
TKIP increases security by adding dynamic key management to replace the static key of 
WEP, and the 64-bit message integrity check (MIC).  Given the size of the MIC, it 
provides protection against message forgery.  TKIP also offers a TKIP sequence counter 
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(TSC) within the IV that drops packets delivered out of order as a form of replay 
protection.  TKIP also uses a cryptographic mixing function to combine TSC, a temporal 
key, and the target address into the cryptographic key.  Prior to 802.11i/WPA, WEP did 
not encrypt the IV at all, thus TKIP is less prone to attack.   
Counter mode, cipher block chaining-message authentication code 
protocol (CCMP) provides all four security services: authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, and replay protection.  The CCMP is new to wireless technology through the 
802.11i and, as stated earlier, requires new hardware development.  It utilizes the AES 
encryption algorithm with a 128-bit key.  CCMP combines counter mode (for 
confidentiality) and cipher lock chaining message authentication code (for authentication 
and integrity).  A temporal key (TK) and pseudo-randomly generated number, or nonce, 
is required for each communication session.  Also, additional authentication data (AAD) 
from the MAC header is included to provide extra integrity (MAC fields that vary are 
excluded).  The MIC, described above, is included within the CCM process of 
encapsulation.  Replay protection is incorporated into the process at the end of 
decapsulation when the receiver extracts the packet number for verification.  As with 
TKIP, CCM provides for dynamic key management with the cryptographic keys.  A 
fresh, never used, key is required at the start of each new session between AP and host 
station.   
During the authentication process, as the host station and AP go into the 
association phase, the negotiation of the security parameters take place.  The key 
exchange required for privacy takes place after mutual 802.1X authentication takes place.  
As described in the authentication section there are several handshakes between the 
supplicant, authentication agent, and authentication server.  These are necessary to 
indicate that the link has been secured by the keys and allow normal data traffic.  The 
handshake is performed using EAPOL (EAP over LAN).  With CCMP the MAC is 
configured to discard data received over an association that is unprotected by the 
encapsulation algorithm.  This is necessary or plaintext traffic could traverse the network 
with impunity. [7]  
C. IEEE 802.11 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures 
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Threats are events or activities that have the potential to cause harm to 
information systems or networks.  The term “threat” can apply to a myriad of events or 
activities, including environmental disasters, but here our interest in threat is on those 
threats associated specifically with wireless technology.  In contrast, where threat implies 
an event or activity, “vulnerability” describes a weakness in, or absence of, precautions, 
exposing a potential for a threat to occur.  In the past several years, we have seen 
vulnerabilities in wireless technologies that have lead to network attacks.   
Wireless Threats 
Wireless threats due to outsider attack are considered either passive or active.  
Passive threats are associated with attackers gaining access to an asset but not modifying 
its content.  Active threats are associated with attackers gaining access to an asset and 
modifying its content.   
Many wireless threats come from internal personnel, accidentally or intentionally.  
Often individual wireless users do not understand the danger they create merely by 
attaching an AP to a wired network.  For instance, unauthorized APs can be easily 
deployed by anyone with access to a network connection, anywhere within the 
organization.  These individuals may or may not be aware of the security policy and they 
may assume that a simple AP device could not increase the vulnerability of the overall 
network.   
In addition, incorrectly configured APs offer a similar security threat.  An AP out 
of the box in default mode works with no encryption and is commonly configured to 
openly broadcast SSIDs to authorized users.  In some cases honest network 
administrators have incorrectly used SSIDs as passwords to verify authorized users.  In 
this case a broadcast configured AP with no encryption activated would provide intruders 
with the “password” to operate on the organization network.     
Authorized users can also threaten the availability of the network with abuses that 
drain connection speeds, consume bandwidth, and hinder a wireless LAN's overall 
performance. A few users who clog the network by trading MP3 files can affect the 
productivity of everyone on the wireless network. This affects all users of a network.  
These types of issues can be more difficult to identify and narrow down. 
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Overall, careless and deceitful actions by both loyal and disgruntled employees 
cause security threats and performance issues to wireless networks.  These risks are only 
intensified by blatantly unauthorized APs, improper security measures, and network 
abuses present.  This can occur with or without an organizational wireless policy in place.   
Many of the threats described above are mitigated through sound security 
practices.  Consistent, robust security practices are conveyed through a well prepared 
security policy.  This greatly lowers a chance for a catastrophic active threat attack within 
the wireless network.   
Wireless Vulnerabilities 
It is common knowledge today that wireless technology includes numerous 
weaknesses.  Wireless vulnerabilities stem from the general nature of wireless 
propagation as well as the protection mechanisms established to secure the data passing 
over a wireless network.  The original definition of security within the 802.11 standard, 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) has been proven to contain weaknesses, making it 
inadequate for protecting networks containing sensitive information.  Since the awareness 
of WEP vulnerabilities there has been a rush to mitigate the vulnerability associated with 
wireless security.   
The intent of 802.11i/WPA is to alleviate most, if not all, of the original 802.11 
standard vulnerabilities.  When the mandatory CCMP 802.11i standard is implemented 
correctly, it will create a robust security system with wireless technology.  It must be 
understood that the CCMP within 802.11i is new and complex, requiring a greater 
understanding of networking and security mechanisms within upper layers of the OSI 
model.   
Additionally, a prepackaged solution for the CCMP 802.11i/WPA standard is not 
commercially available yet, although the optional TKIP 802.11i standard is presently 
offered on the market.  Several companies such as Cisco, 3Com and Lucent have 
developed 802.1X EAP protocols and authentication servers compatible with the TKIP 
802.11i/WPA standard.  These that can be considered safe alternatives to the original 
WEP until the most robust CCMP 802.11i/WPA hardware is commercially available.   
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Although the 802.11i alleviates many existing vulnerabilities it is important to 
recognize the more serious weaknesses associated with WEP. The following sections 
describe existing security vulnerabilities with the original 802.11 security and suggested 
options available today to mitigate the risk.   
WEP authentication: Vulnerability 
WEP does not offer two-way authentication.  WEP instead provides a 
method for authenticating host station machines through wireless to APs.  There is no 
process for the AP to authenticate itself to the host station.  The host stations can not have 
reasonable assurance that the wireless AP they are connected to is legitimate component 
of the organizational network.  [7] 
WEP authentication: Solution  
The most robust option in this case would be to adopt the 2002 WPA 
standard that utilizes the 802.1X upper layer security suite.  The utilization of the 
Authentication Server removes the authentication burden from the host station or the AP 
and places it in a separate entity within the network.  As described in the 802.11i section 
for authentication, WPA offers a true two-way authentication.  It requires a high level of 
IT competence to set up and operate.   
A second option would be to purchase a vendor solution for a VPN that 
utilizes fairly secure encryption, such as IPsec.  The VPN would force the two-way 
authentication before connection is established.  Also, the AP and router on the wired 
side of the network would be configured to drop packets not configured for the proper 
IPsec connection.   
Key management: WEP key management: Vulnerability 
Key management is not specified in the WEP standard.  This causes major 
threats to a wireless network from weak policy procedures.  In order to use WEP within a 
network the WEP key must be manually distributed and individually programmed into 
APs and host stations throughout the group of wireless users.  This manual management 
burden is intensified as the wireless APs are increased within an organization to support a 
greater audience.   
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Several weak key management policies can result in the introduction of 
vulnerabilities.  Weak policy, vulnerability no. 1: Since manual WEP configuration can 
be burdensome sometimes WEP on each AP is disabled and the APs broadcast in the 
clear for ease of use.   Weak policy, vulnerability no. 2: It can be a natural progression to 
lighten the management responsibilities by selecting one WEP key to share between all 
nodes and users of the network.  Weak policy, vulnerability no. 3: Since synchronizing 
the change of keys is tedious and difficult, keys are seldom changed. Overall, without 
interoperable key management, keys will tend to be long-lived and of poor quality.  [12] 
Key management: WEP key management: Solution 
The best option is to develop a comprehensive policy for wireless 
equipment and verify policy is obeyed.  The policy must impose all the security 
requirements for APs and host stations.  The IT department must document all personnel 
with authorization to access the wireless LAN, information on the specific computer used 
for access, private key information for APs, and when information is changed the files 
must be updated.  For added security the policy should include written policy for the 
network security personnel to verify compliance on a regular basis.   
Key management: WEP key size: Vulnerability 
The original 802.11 standard specifies a 40-bit key size.  The 802.11 
standard was written in 1997.  At that time it was expected a 40-bit key would be 
sufficient to protect against casual spying.  In the past few years this 40-bit key has been 
cited as a huge weakness of wireless hardware.   
It is known that an attacker that has access to both encrypted and plain text 
will be capable of deciphering the RC4 encryption stream, thus having the ability to 
decipher all future encrypted packets.  Since the 40-bit key size is inadequate any attacker 
able to monitor traffic and can send traffic to induce a standard response from the 
intended victim, such as a ping reply.  The attacker will then have enough information to 
recover the original cipher stream.   
In response to this 40-bit key weakness, vendors today have implemented 
a configuration option that requires a key size of 104 bits.  It is designated as a "128-bit" 
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WEP key.  Selecting the WEP “128 bit” encryption option requires a 13 ASCII or 26 
hexadecimal digit character key.  In comparison the 40-bit WEP selection requires an 8 
ASCII or 16 hexadecimal digit character key.  As would be expected, the 104-bit keys are 
more resistant to brute-force attacks.  But, it does not greatly increase the overall security 
of WEP.  It can be cracked by passive sniffing of network packets given a persistent 
individual.  In addition, WEP must still be enabled on the equipment when installed. [12] 
Key management: Solution 
Today’s best option is to purchase the temporal key integrity protocol 
(TKIP) upgraded wireless equipment present within the 802.11b/a/g equipment.  This 
equipment is 2002 WPA compliant and offers the highest form of wireless security on the 
market today.  It will provide interim strengthening corrections for WEP through the 
TKIP and also offers two-way authentication between AP and host stations.  It must be 
noted that it proves weak against forgery and man-in-the-middle attacks.   
Initialization Vector is too small: Vulnerability 
WEP’s associated RC4 encryption key includes a 24-bit initialization 
vector (IV).  The encryption key is constant for each encrypted packet and the IV is used 
to further differentiate the individual packet transmissions through the 802.11 
concatenation process.  Note the IV is sent in the clear with each packet.  Several attacks 
are possible through the small size of the IV and the astronomical number of packets sent 
over the network for daily communications.   
The IV size of 24 bits provides for a possible 16,777,216 different RC4 
cipher streams for a given WEP key.  The same plaintext encrypted with the same key 
will always result in the same ciphertext.  Thus, when an IV is used more than once with 
a given RC4 cipher stream it creates a linear encryption pattern that can be computed 
through statistical analysis.  In addition, IVs can be created that are weaker in nature and 
expose the RC4 cipher stream to a greater extent, thus limiting the true number of true IV 
choices. [12]  
Initialization Vector is too small: Solution 
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Purchase of the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) upgraded wireless 
equipment present within the 802.11b/a/g equipment will protect against this weakness.  
The 2002 WPA compliant wireless equipment provides strengthening corrections for 
WEP.   It must be noted that WPA proves weak against forgery and man in the middle 
attacks.   
Integrity Check Value algorithm not secure: Vulnerability 
The WEP integrity check value (ICV), based on CRC-32 (cyclic 
redundancy check) is intended to detect random errors within transmissions.  The intent 
behind CRC is to offer redundant frame information in order for the receiver to verify 
data has not changed over the transmission.  ICV is not associated with cryptographic 
security and is incapable of protection against malicious inaccuracies.   
For instance, in a bit-flipping and replay attack an attacker can utilize the 
linear nature of ICV in order to flip bits and recalculate the new ICV CRC-32.  This 
modified packet, even though it has not been deciphered by the attacker, is then sent 
through an AP with a known IV.  The AP will forward the modified packet through given 
that the ICV is correct.  A layer 3 device from the network will produce a rejection since 
the packet is not truly valid.  The rejection will be sent back through the AP to the 
attacker.  Since the rejection is predictable the attacker can compare the prediction with 
the encrypted response and derive the cipher stream of the RC4 key. [12] 
Integrity Check Value algorithm not secure: Solution 
TKIP and the future CCMP offer a Message Integrity Code (MIC) along 
with a slightly different procedure protecting against retransmission attacks.  Therefore, 
TKIP-upgraded wireless equipment within the 802.11b/a/g (2002 WPA compliant) 
equipment will prevent ICV vulnerabilities found in WEP. [12]  
MAC Address filtering as sole wireless security measure: Vulnerability 
In the rush to move away from WEP and its supposed weakness, many 
organizations have implemented Media Access Control (MAC) filtering as the sole 
wireless AP security measure.  By definition, each MAC Addresses is globally unique.  
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Users not explicitly authorized by their MAC Address from becoming associated with the 
network would be rejected by the AP.   
Although this seems a reasonable concept, MAC filtering proves 
ineffective against unauthorized intrusions from MAC Address spoofing.  An attacker 
possessing hardware and software capable of sniffing a wireless network can easily 
capture all packets between nearby APs and their host stations.  This captured data 
contains all information required to connect to the wireless LAN.  MAC Address 
spoofing software is also readily available to anyone with internet access.  The spoofing 
software allows the user to easily rewrite normal address resolution protocol (ARP) 
packets with an authorized MAC Address instead of the MAC Address configured into 
the attacker’s host Network Interface Card (NIC). [13]  
MAC Address filtering as sole wireless security measure: Solution 
An option is to purchase the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) 
upgraded wireless equipment present within the 802.11b/a/g (2002 WPA compliant) 
equipment that supports MAC filtering in addition to the WPA.  When used together, 
they form a fairly effective security solution.  It is important to activate the WPA since 
MAC Address filtering alone is easily overcome by spoofing.  It is also important to 
practice other sound security practices with WPA.   
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III. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL WIRELESS CASE STUDY 
A. Naval Postgraduate School Wireless Plan  
In early 2001, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) planned to extend its wired 
network with an industry-standard wireless local area network by the fall of 2002.  The 
goal was to have a wireless infrastructure to support multiple platforms (e.g., Personal 
Digital Assistance (PDA), and laptops) and multiple operating systems (e.g., Microsoft 
Windows, MAC OS, and Linux).  Also NPS wanted the wireless infrastructure to be 
scalable, seamless, and reasonably secured, despite the fear, uncertainty, and doubts 
regarding wireless vulnerabilities. [14] In practice, this ambitious endeavor exceeded 
their ability to rollout a secure wireless infrastructure as planned.  Although constrained 
by budget, leadership pressure, and perceived urgency for wireless functionality, the NPS 
IT department put together a wireless security solution utilizing currently available 
industry capabilities.  Early in the wireless planning, the NPS Wireless Warrior Group 
was established and tasked to write the NPS Wireless Policy, conduct surveys, determine 
wireless requirements, analyze the wireless networks, and assist in the roll out of wireless 
at NPS.  This group is still function in an advisory role today.    
1. The NPS Wireless Warrior Group 
The Wireless Warrior Group is comprised of students, faculty, and staff 
members who have an interest in wireless technology.  Their first assignment was to 
write the wireless policy.   The NPS wireless policy derived from careful review and 
analysis of wireless policies of prominent campuses (e.g. such as Carnegie Mellon 
University (CMU), Columbia, Drexel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Harvard, Wake Forest, American University, West Point), as well as review of the draft 
version of the Department of Defense (DoD) “wireless use” policy that was recently 
approved in April 2004.  From those policies and local security considerations, NPS 
derived its own wireless policy, IT 202, in February 2002.   
The goals of the policy are to limit the potential wireless security risks, 
educate the users to the benefits of wireless, and to establish NPS wireless network 
standards.  The policy also provides guidelines (see Figure III-1) for the registration and 
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purchase of new departmental wireless APs to ensure interoperability, security, and 
manageability. 
 
Figure III-1 AP Installation and Purchase Guideline [15] 
2. NPS Wireless Requirements 
While drafting the wireless policy, NPS conducted two identical on-line 
surveys (see Figure III-2).  The first survey ran for 14 days from November 23 thru 
December 7th, 2001 with 250 individuals out of 1339 possible participating.  Ten months 
later, the second survey ran for 10 days from August 28 thru September 6th, 2002 with 
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208 individuals out of 1285 possible participating.   The results of the two surveys were 
almost identical. 
Most of the participants believed that wireless would add value, 
productivity, and usability to their research and studies.  The surveys also revealed the 
participants strong concern about wireless security, as well as a strong desire for wireless 
access to email, web, and file transfer functions.   
The requirements for the NPS wireless implementation were derived from 
a variety of input, including the experience collected from other universities, NPS 
wireless meetings, DoD requirements, and the NPS user surveys.  Major requirements are 
listed below [14]:  
• For geographic coverage, NPS wireless system shall cover the entirely of the NPS 
campus  
• For scalability, the system chosen should be scalable to meet the requirements of 
a population of between 2000 and 3000 users.  Provisioning for future access 
should include La Mesa and Fort Ord military housing area. 
• For hardware and software, NPS shall choose non-proprietary, interoperable 
systems that conform to accepted industry standards.   
• For availability requirements NPS systems shall provide a 50% AP overlap with 
reference to projected propagation and 99.99% availability.   
• For encryption and authentication, NPS systems should be FIPS 140 encryption 
certified (AES or 3DES) and extendable to include PKI for authentication. 
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Figure III-2 NPS Wireless Survey [15] 
3. NPS Wireless Pilot Program 
In February 2002, with an approved wireless policy and a defined list of 
requirements, NPS rolled out a wireless pilot program with 30 APs installed throughout 
the campus.  In September 2003, NPS enhanced its wireless security by requiring that the 
WEP key be changed quarterly, which is posted on a secure website on the NPS intranet.  
NPS also enhanced its wireless security by increasing the WEP key encryption from 64-
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bit to 128-bit.  Figure III-3 depicts an initial architecture of the NPS WLAN roll out as of 
August 2002.  The security functions for this WLAN are provided by WEP at the AP.   
 
Figure III-3 Initial NPS WLAN Infrastructure [14] 
In order to connect to the network, all wireless users must register their 
mobile devices with the campus-wide IT Management Department, ITACS (Figure III-4).  
All users must provide their laptop and wireless interface card MAC addresses to ITACS.  
These are required for audit purposes rather than for access control.  ITACS verifies the 
users’ devices for up-to-date patches, critical updates, and the latest virus definitions.  If 
the system is not conformant, ITACS installs the latest patches, critical updates, and virus 
definitions.  Once ITACS has hardened the device, the WEP key and SSID are installed.  
The user’s username and password are logged into the LDAP server for the purpose of 
authentication.  Also, the user username is added to the “wireless email” distribution list.  
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The original intent was that every quarter, wireless users will be sent an email 
notification with a link to a secure web site to retrieve the new WEP key and SSID.  In 
conjunction with the new WEP key and SSID, all users are required to change their 
passwords according to network security policy.  In actuality these quarterly requirements 
have not been implemented.   
 
Figure III-4 Registering for Wireless Access Guidelines [15] 
4. Current NPS WLAN Infrastructure 
NPS examined several WLAN security solutions before selecting one (see 
Table III-1).  CISCO offered 802.1X and LEAP authentication for their security solution, 
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but LEAP is a CISCO proprietary protocol.  CRANITE offered EAP-TLS as its 
authentication protocol and a proprietary encryption solution using AES.  Yet, EAP-TLS 
requires a PKI infrastructure and NPS decided PKI authentication was too burdensome 
for the client in the near term.  FUNK offered EAP-TTLS as the authentication protocol 
and required IEEE 802.1X and RADIUS but NPS has chosen not to implement the IEEE 
802.1X standard at this time.  Finally, Fortresstech offered a proprietary authentication 
mechanism using an AES and 3DES encryption solution but once again NPS sought a 
non-proprietary solution.  The ReefEdge product offered interoperability with the 
existing NPS IT infrastructure, involved no proprietary authentication or encryption 
scheme, and met the NPS IT budget. 
Vendors Security Solution 
www.reefedge.com  Offers SSL authentication and 3DES encryption solution 
www.cisco.com  Offers 802.1X and LEAP authentication  
www.cranite.com  Uses EAP-TLS as its authentication protocol and implements 
a proprietary encryption solution using AES  
www.funk.com Offers EAP-TTLS (requires 802.1X and RADIUS) 
www.fortresstech.com  Implements proprietary authentication mechanism and uses 
AES and 3DES encryption solution 
Table III-1 WLAN Security Vendors and Security Solutions [14] 
NPS relies on a username and password for its authentication method.  
Authentication of wireless users is accomplished between a Remote Authentication Dial-
In User Service (RADIUS) server and the Lightweight Directory Access Control Protocol 
(LDAP) server.  In order for wireless users to connect to the NPS network, the users need 
know the AP’s SSID and the WEP key, both of which are posted on the NPS intranet 
website.   
The NPS LAN infrastructure was enhanced by adding an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) and a RADIUS server, Figure III-5.  The Intrusion Detection System is 
capable of real-time monitoring for rogue APs as well as for network attacks.  Figure III-
5 displays a conceptual interpretation of the NPS network.   
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Figure III-5 NPS Current WLAN Infrastructure [14] 
B. NPS WIRELESS NETWORK VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
After NPS completed the initial wireless LAN implementation, it conducted three 
passive vulnerability assessments of the NPS wireless LAN using the network analysis 
tools shown in Table III-2. 
On February 16, 2002 NPS conducted the first network analysis using 
NetStumbler.  Some of the results are shown in Figure III-6.  NetStumbler was able to 
capture the APs MAC addresses, identify beaconing APs SSIDs, and identify WEP 
enabled APs.  The results of the passive monitoring revealed that for 8 out of 13 APs 
WEB was not enabled for one reason or another.  All of the APs monitored were 
broadcasting their SSID.   
The APs depicted in Figure III-6 that are blank under the WEP column are the 
most vulnerable APs since they did not have WEP encryption enabled.  Without WEP 
enabled, an unauthorized person can connect to the internal network without WEP 
authentication.  Note that the columns MAC address and SSID are obscured for privacy 





Identifies AP MAC addresses, SSID if broadcast, 
transmitting channel, manufacturer, status of 
WEP (on/off), etc 
Mini-Stumbler 
http://www.netstumbler.com 
Handheld PC version of NetStumbler 




Same as NetStumbler plus it detects the SSID 
even when not broadcast 
Ethereal 
http://www.ethereal.com 
Freeware network protocol analyzer for Unix and 
Windows. It allows examination of data from a 
live network or from a capture file on disk. 
Users can interactively browse the capture data, 
viewing summary and detailed information for 
each packet. Ethereal has several powerful 
features, including a rich display filter language 
and the ability to view the reconstructed stream 
of a TCP session. 
VxSniffer 
http://www.cam.com/vxsniffer.html 
Eavesdrop to obtain MAC address for spoofing 
Table III-2 Network Protocol Analyzer Tools [14] 
After the first assessment, an education campaign was launched to raise and to 
improve wireless security awareness with the help of the NPS IT support staff.  Three 
months after the vulnerability testing, NPS conducted the second vulnerability 
assessment, again with NetStumbler.  This time, the results were much better.  The 
number of broadcasting SSIDs was reduced and all were using WEP.  It is apparent that, 
in order to reduce vulnerabilities, all wireless users need to be trained in wireless security 
measures and the requirements of the wireless policy.   
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Note: certain columns have been obscured purposely  
Figure III-6 NetStumbler Example [14]  
Three months later on August 2002, a third vulnerability assessment of NPS 
wireless network was conducted using the Pocket PC version MiniStumbler, AirSnort 
and AirMagnet tools.  This time around MiniStumbler captured 8 MAC addresses, 
AirSnort captured 18 MAC addresses, and AirMagnet captured 53 MAC addresses.   
In the fall of 2003, NPS purchased the AirMagnet Distributed 4.0 system, which 
is an around the clock network protocol analyzer and monitor system.  As of today, the 
system is running and provides a huge amount of network information.  Unfortunately the 
NPS IT department does not have enough IT personnel to monitor and analyze all of the 
data collected by AirMagnet Distributed System.  Network security for the NPS wireless 
network continues to be a delicate balancing act between updated technology and having 
a large enough, adequately trained manpower group to monitor and analyze the 
information and react to attacks in real time. [14] 
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IV. FAA IT INFRASTRUCTURE  
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is responsible for the safety 
of civil aviation, provides a safe, secure, and efficient global airspace system that 
contributes to national security and the economy. The FAA is divided into nine regions 
with regional headquarters from Anchorage, Alaska to Atlanta, Georgia, see Figure IV-1. 
The agency's two largest Research and Development Center facilities are the FAA Mike 
Monroney Aeronautical Center (MMAC) at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the William 
J. Hughes Technical Center (WJHTC) at Atlantic City, New Jersey.   
 
Figure IV-1 FAA Regional Locations [16] 
The WJHTC is the model for analysis of the FAA IT infrastructure.  The WJHTC 
is the FAA’s vital research, development, test and evaluation facility. The aviation 
research focus is on air traffic management, communications, navigation and 
surveillance, airport and aircraft safety, and aviation security. Its unique facilities include: 
air traffic control laboratories and an air traffic simulation facility; a human factors 
laboratory; weather laboratories; a fleet of specially instrumented aircraft, ranging in size 
from small planes to helicopters and large transports; the world’s largest full-scale 
aviation fire test facility; a chemistry laboratory; an impact test facility; radar test 
laboratories; the National Airport Pavement Test Facility; and an aviation security 
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laboratory. The WJHTC not only serves as a cornerstone for aviation advancements, but 
is also a key focal point for Homeland Security.   
A. WJHTC Current IT Infrastructure 
The WJHTC consists of over 15 internal offices from The Office of Enterprise 
Performance (ACF) that provides performance and financial planning, develops policies 
and strategies to the Information Security Group (ACB-250) that identifies, evaluates and 
proposes candidate technical security solutions for both existing (legacy) and future 
(acquisition) systems.  
The WJHTC utilizes Windows 98, 2000, NT and XP (Professional) operating 
systems in support of operations, administration, and research.  The network file server is 
supported by Novell NetWare and Microsoft Windows NT.  For remote dial-in access to 
the Internet and access to e-mail while traveling, the WJHTC provides Mobile Citrix for 
their employees to stay connected to the office. 
The example in Figure IV-2 offers a conceptual illustration of the internal 
network of the WHJTC.  This model indicates the security posture of the WHJTC 
utilizing firewall, DMZ, outers, and switches.  For security reasons, Figure IV-2 is only a 
representation of the WHJT Center internal network and not its actual layout. 
B. Wireless Deployment Considerations at FAA 
The foremost goal of the FAA with respect to wireless technology is to increase 
productivity in its processes and employees while maintaining security.  This must be 
accomplished through a transition process that maintains a high security position.  To 
meet this end the FAA transition process must be developed through careful 
consideration of any unique FAA mission needs in conjunction with commercial best 
practices and policy requirements.   
There are unique requirements associated with wireless implementation that must 
be addressed by the FAA in order to support the transition to wireless technology.  For 
instance, a comprehensive site survey for wireless hardware implementation will be 
necessary to ensure complete coverage within the designated area.  The site survey must 
also document the capability required by the hardware to provide satisfactory density and 
network throughput for the targeted area and wireless host located within it.  Another 
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requirement the FAA may choose to impose would be that WLAN technology be 







Figure IV-2  WJHTC IT Network Representation 
In addition, customer support services will need to include wireless support, from 
technical to administrative issues.  This may include creation and ongoing maintenance 
of wireless support web pages within the WHJTC web site.  For example, the web space 
could provide policies, operational status of the FAA wireless infrastructure, reference 
materials and how-to guides.   
Finally, it must be understood that specific implementations, as well as the scope 
and goals of wireless deployment at FAA, will need to be addressed by the FAA CIO. 
The CIO must decide how to strategically and efficiently utilize wireless technologies in 
accordance with the FAA’s mission.  The next chapter will explore wireless policy and 
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V. WIRELESS POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
A. Introduction 
The FAA is presently under FAA Order 1370.82 Information Systems Security 
Program dated June 9, 2000. [17] In response to the United States Computer Security Act 
of 1987, this Order establishes the policy to ensure computer security implementation 
within the FAA and assigns organizational and management responsibilities.  FAA Order 
1370.86 AVR information Systems Security Protection dated March 1, 2001, establishes 
minimum requirements for Information Systems Security Protection and describes the 
implementation of security policy for the FAA. [18] 
The focus of this chapter is to provide a foundation for development of an FAA 
wireless policy prior to wireless implementation.  This document has described major 
technologies behind wireless communications, some of the threats and weaknesses with 
suggestions to mitigate them, and a selection of wireless tools for deployment.  We have 
also described the deployment of wireless communications at NPS and the IT architecture 
at the FAA WHJT Center.  This chapter describes the essential elements of a wireless 
security policy.   
B. Wireless Security Policy 
Development of a wireless policy, in addition to existing security policy, will 
greatly facilitate the introduction of wireless technology into an organization.  Wireless 
defense mechanisms incorporate many existing IT security implementations, yet wireless 
technology, by its nature, increases the requirement for new protection techniques.  By 
developing a wireless policy, an organization is actively contributing to its computer 
security.  Development of the wireless policy as a prerequisite to wireless implementation 
offers a well-organized evolution to the process of introducing wireless technology.   
In general, a security policy must be understandable, realistic, consistent, 
enforceable, visible, flexible, and it must be periodically reviewed as described below:  
• Understandable — The policy must be easy for users to comply with. Stay 
away from ambiguous terms to prevent users from misinterpretation.  
• Realistic — Understand the organizational priorities for securing its data and 
the amount of communications required by its personnel to share the data.  It 
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is important the policy meet business, technological and security needs 
simultaneously.  A security policy must strike a balance between functionality 
and security.  
• Consistent — It is important to maintain consistency with the policy.  Policy 
should not change often or it will add confusion to personnel.    
• Enforceable — Policy must have the full support of all management levels.  If 
consequences are not applied equally when personnel are found in 
noncompliance the policy is effectively irrelevant.   
• Visible —Users must be aware of the policy and understand it for it to be 
effective.  
• Flexible — The policy should permit adaptation to the ever-changing world of 
technology and people.  
• Reviewed – The policy must be maintained by reviewing it on a recurring 
basis in order to prevent the information from becoming obsolete.  [19]  
1. Considerations for Wireless Policy 
 The wireless policy will be developed similar to any IT security policy.  For 
instance, definition of the security goals and objectives as well as the identification of 
authority and their responsibilities, is foremost to a wireless security policy.  Effective 
wireless security policy within an organization will encompass procedural controls in 
addition to technological restraints.  In perspective, there are affects from wireless 
technology that require special consideration during the wireless security policy 
development.    For the sake of brevity, the following sections describe fundamental 
policy considerations that are applicable to wireless networks: 
 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessments are imperative to the development of a well-planned wireless 
security policy.  The vulnerabilities and threats applicable to wireless technology should 
be identified and investigated for the possible damage an associated attack(s) would 
cause to the organization.  Additionally, each threat and vulnerability should have 
mitigation strategies developed and evaluated.  Risk mitigation information acquired 
during this period will contribute to the design segment of the wireless implementation.   
Ad Hoc versus Infrastructure 
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It is more difficult to regulate security within an ad hoc network.  For this reason, 
an organization may consider using the wireless security policy to deny use of all ad hoc 
configurations within a wireless network.  If the organization chooses to allow ad hoc as 
a benefit to its employees it would behoove them to place boundaries on the ad hoc 
standard and implementation through strict policy. [20] 
Information Classification  
It may be important for an organization to analyze the information it processes 
and establish categories for information management.  Introduction of wireless 
technology may require the organization to evaluate additional policy requirements on 
certain categories of its data.  Keep in mind that in a wireless environment, the risks will 
most likely always outweigh any benefit of allowing sensitive organizational data onto 
wireless segments.  For instance, in order to protect from compromising sensitive data it 
may require policy of no sensitive data on wireless segments.   
Network Segregation  
A common technique for a wireless design within an organization is separate and 
distinct wireless and wired networks.  Wireless segments must connect to a wired 
network at some point to allow Internet or Intranet communications.  In order to 
successfully maintain separation, the connection of these networks should be separated 
by a gateway so that wireless communications only traverse wired network when 
absolutely necessary, Figure V-1 Example of a Segregated Wireless Network.  In 
addition, the organization may even decide to develop policy to require a network 
firewall between the wired and wireless portions of the LAN as an added safeguard.  For 
instance, if a security breach of sensitive network data is not acceptable by an 











Figure V-1 Example of a Segregated Wireless Network [21] 
Wireless Access Point Security  
Depending on the organizational environment and the sensitivity of data on the 
network, an organization may specify certain requirements for AP deployment and 
utilization within the wireless policy.  APs create risks altogether different from normal 
networks.  The organization must evaluate the necessity for policy to dictate certain 
aspects of wireless AP deployment.  Organizational concerns can be mitigated by 
integrating specific AP topics into policy.   
For instance, most APs can be reset to the insecure default mode with physical 
access to the hardware.  With policy, the organization can dictate that APs only be 
located in physically secure spaces where only authorized system administrators have 
access for maintenance and configuration.  Another concern of APs may be the SSID 
broadcast mode.  It may be pertinent to the organization to dictate within the policy that 
all APs have broadcast mode turned off as standard configuration.  Finally, the wireless 
security policy may also establish that no personal wireless APs can be operated within 
the organization’s LAN.   
Wireless Client  
Another category that may require clarification within the wireless security policy 
is wireless client equipment and ownership.  For instance, the organization may already 
allow personal laptops on the organization network.  In this case, the organization should 
consider a wireless security policy dictating user registration requirements for personal 
hardware, as well as stringent requirements for acceptable operating system and 
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application software in addition to requirements for host security mechanisms such as 
virus and personal firewall software.  On the other hand, the organization may desire to 
disallow all personal equipment on the wireless network.  In this is the case, the 
organization would supply all of wireless equipment and there may be additional security 
policy specifying that the IT department maintain plant account records for wireless 
equipment.   
Authentication  
A wireless environment presents additional authentication concerns that can be 
addressed in the wireless security policy.  Since the ability to spoof an AP is an elevated 
possibility in the wireless environment, it is important to exercise safeguards not 
necessary within a comparable wired network.  For instance, through security policy the 
organization can require mutual or two-way authentication between host stations and APs 
without dictating any specific design.  Thus, this policy requirement would compel the 
designers to employ a solution more robust than standard WEP.   
Encryption 
Confidentiality is one of the three key factors in network security.  In order to 
provide confidentiality within a wireless network it is crucial to deploy encryption.  The 
wireless security policy should be the guideline to ensure confidential wireless 
communications.  The policy should address the minimum requirements for encryption 
on the wireless network.   
The organization must determine the factors to be included within policy for 
encryption topics such as strength, method, implementation, management, and frequency 
of use. [21] For instance, the organization may designate an encryption management 
requirement that different keys be utilized for authentication and encryption.  Another 
point to consider is the utilization of encryption that employs derived keys instead of 
master keys for the encryption process.  This will help to limit the availability of the 
master key to attack. [22] The specified level of each encryption factor in the wireless 
security policy should be chosen based on corporation threat factors and sensitivity of 
network data.   
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Availability  
Although not required, the wireless security policy can delineate AP propagation 
and availability testing.  Testing propagation characteristics prior to implementation 
minimizes deployment issues such as radio frequency (RF) interference by addressing 
problems before implementation.  The security policy can include requirements for pre-
deployment testing as well as periodic maintenance testing after implementation.   
“The policy should force the execution of wireless availability tests, indicate 
the specific testing tools, provide a reasonable frequency for which the tests 
are to be conducted, and define a time-frame for test completion. While 
wireless networks will undoubtedly encounter interference from time to time, 
defining availability tests and tools in the policy and the subsequent execution 
of these tests will help reduce signal loss and improve availability.” [21] 
Education  
The wireless security policy can be used to dictate policy for educating users, 
administrators, and managers regarding wireless security issues.  For instance, an 
organization can use wireless security policy to require IT personnel receive yearly off-
site training on wireless security issues.  If the personnel are taught how to secure their 
systems and informed of the latest threats to wireless technology, the benefits are two-
fold, individuals will more likely appreciate security issues and they will be more apt to 
take the steps necessary to limit activities that put the network at risk. [23]  
Enforcement 
In order to enforce the security policy over time, it is important to describe 
maintenance requirements.  The wireless security policy can dictate to the IT security 
staff exactly what should be monitored for noncompliance, how often monitoring should 
take place, what should be accomplished when noncompliance is discovered, and what 
should be documented, including routine tests where no discrepancies are noted.  For 
instance, it is important to test for wireless APs that are operational on the network, but 
not specifically authorized.   
In addition, during the initial implementation of a wireless policy in an 
environment where a certain number of wireless devices already exist, the organization 
may provide a grace period for all users to comply with the new policy.  The extent of the 
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allotted time to comply with the policy is determined by the organization but it is 
suggested this period not be more than 90 days.  This situation is unlikely for the FAA 
given the moratorium on wireless. [23] 
Summary 
Within a wireless network environment it is paramount that organizations develop 
and implement security policies specific to wireless technology in order to ensure 
optimum security.  A well-planned wireless security policy is an important step in a 
methodical implementation of wireless networking.  
C. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WIRELESS STANDARD 
OVERVIEW 
The focus of this section is to describe the draft version of The DOT 
PDA/Wireless Security Implementation Standard dated November 2003.  The first 
section of the DOT standard identifies some of the common forms of wireless attacks. 
The second section defines some of the general security controls.  The next three sections 
outline the access point, PDA, and blackberry device security settings.  The final section 
introduces some of the wireless security products on the market. 
The Department considers wireless technologies a high risk.  The DOT standard 
requires that all IT technologies be validated through the NIST SP800-37 Certification 
and Accreditation program. [24] The DOT recommends that all new wireless network 
implementations should be Wireless Protected Access (WPA) or 802.11i compliant.  The 
DOT also recommends that the following mechanisms should be added if they are not 
currently being used:  
• A RADIUS Server for 802.1X support for access control and authentication 
• Client 802.1X software for access control and authentication 
• EAP-TLS for authentication 





The FAA is required to align its wireless policy with that of the Department of 
Transportation.  Consistency with the DOT Security Policy is recommended since it 
adheres to commercial practices and it is not overly restrictive.   
D. DOD DIRECTIVE 8100.2 WIRELESS USE  
In April 2004, the DoD released a policy (DoD Directive 8100.2 Use of 
Commercial Wireless Devices, Services, and Technologies in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Global Information Grid (GIG)), signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz.   This is a high level wireless directive that establishes policy and 
responsibilities to ensure information confidentiality, authentication, availability, 
integrity, and non-repudiation of communications carried by wireless technology within 
the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG).   
The policy lays out the responsibilities for a number of different defense agencies.  
It requires end-to-end use of data encryption on wireless systems to include cell phones, 
wireless laptop computers, personal digital assistants and a variety of other devices.  It 
requires that the encryption technologies used for wireless communication comply with 
the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 security level 1 or level 2 
cryptographic validation program based on the sensitivity of the data. 
FIPS 140-2 defines the security requirements for all software and hardware 
products implementing cryptography. Within FIPS 140-2, there are 4 different security 
levels.  Security Level 1 provides the lowest level of security.  Security Level 2 provides 
physical security of Level 1 with tamper evident coatings or seals.  The next two levels 
improve and enhance physical protection. [25] 
The DoD policy requires strong Identification and Authentication measures at the 
device and network level for accessing DoD databases in accordance with DoD 
Instruction 8500.2: Information Assurance Implementation. [26] The DoD prohibits the 
storing of classified data unless approved by the Designated Approving Authority 
(DAA). Classified data must be encrypted by NSA approved encryption e.g., AES.  Other 
provisions of the directive prohibit the downloading of mobile code from non-DoD 
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sources, and require the installation of anti-virus software on wireless-capable 
workstations and portable devices.  
Department officials also were directed to establish a knowledge management 
process enabling users to share information on vulnerabilities, best practices and 
alternative mitigating techniques.  The DoD requires all wireless devices to be in 
compliance with DoD Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation. The 
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VI.  RECOMMENDED WIRELESS ROLLOUT PLAN FOR FAA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Network security is a vital requirement today.  In order to maintain security while 
implementing wireless technology it is necessary to approach the implementation 
systematically.  It is important to prepare an implementation plan that will methodically 
address major concerns associated with the technology while maintaining security during 
the course of action.  Major concepts instrumental in the rollout of wireless technology 
include policy, planning, and requirements.     
Policy in the case of wireless implementation holds two major purposes.  First, 
the organization’s security policy provides the primary guide to developing the internal 
implementation plan.  When dictated from senior management, security policy delineates 
goals and restrictions of the technology implementation guiding decisions throughout the 
wireless implementation.  Second, security policy developed to define the internal uses of 
a new technology will assist management with a documented record of constraints for its 
employees.  While the organization’s existing security policy will be a guide throughout 
the implementation process, the internal security policy will be a vital security tool within 
the organization.    
Planning is a vital part of any implementation.  The implementation plan must 
define the individual actions required to accomplish the wireless implementation.  The 
intent of a plan is to portray the intended path for management and for employees of an 
organization.  The plan adds organization to the process.   
Requirements are necessary to define the boundaries of the implementation.  It is 
important to develop requirements in order to shift from planning into actual 
implementation.  Without defined requirements, there would be no means to determine if 
the plans are sufficient to accomplish the implementation.   
It is also important to understand that planning, policy, and requirements are not 
mutually exclusive entities within an implementation plan.  While the plan will be the 
overarching product driving the implementation process, it is important to consider that it 
is interwoven with policy and requirements.  The internal policy development will 
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ultimately drive the requirements.  The requirements will be used to document 
organization specific needs for the implementation.  The plan must initially be outlined in 
order to recognize a process for wireless implementation but, both policy and 
requirements may drive changes to the timeline of the initial plan during the 
implementation process.   
Finally, it is important that research play a role in the development of the wireless 
implementation plan for the FAA.  For instance, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), Technology Division U.S. Department of Commerce, offers an 
extremely helpful tool, Wireless Network Security 802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld 
Devices, Special Publications 800-48 [27].  Although it was completed prior to the 
release of 802.11i it describes general information on wireless technology that will be a 
helpful tool throughout the planning and implementation process.   
B. POLICY 
The previous chapter expresses the importance of security policy within an 
organization.  For all organizations it is vital to develop a policy coupled to the goals and 
objectives of their mission.  It is strongly recommended that senior management within 
FAA provide for the development of a thorough security policy in conjunction with the 
implementation plan of wireless components.   
C. DEFINE A GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION WITH MILESTONES 
One of the major recommendations to the FAA is to institute a phased installation 
plan of the wireless network.  For instance, within a large enterprise such as the FAA the 
initial phase may be a prototype implementation that includes only one department, the 
second phase may include an entire geographic location within the organization, and the 
third phase may be the enterprise wide implementation.  Each phase might be contingent 
upon the successful completion of the previous phase.   
Development of a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) for each phase of 
implementation will assist the FAA by offering a managed approach to the process.  It is 
important that the POA&M include all the items affecting a wireless implementation.  
For instance, existing network security policy should be modified to include wireless 
technology prior to the implementation.  It is important to have policy modification 
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included within the POA&M.  It is suggested that the FAA include, but not be limited to, 
defined stages such as policy development, wireless requirements development, wireless 
design development, hardware testing and infrastructure implementation.  Include the 
timeframe expected for completion of each stage when applicable.  It is also necessary to 
be as specific as possible with the steps required within each phase, but not be overly 
detailed.   
During creation of the POA&M it is important to investigate relationships 
between the stages in order to delineate precedence and prerequisites.  For instance, it is 
important to test preferred hardware for proper configuration on a test network prior to 
installation within the active network.  In addition, training IT system administrators must 
be complete before final installation.  Both of these can be completed in parallel within 
the hardware testing stage on the POA&M, but should be listed as separate requirements.  
Together, both steps can be considered a prerequisite to installation of the hardware 
within the infrastructure implementation stage.  Also, note that the testing of hardware for 
proper configuration can be started before the wireless policy has been officially 
approved, but training the IT system administrators would not be prudent until the 
hardware and software suite selection has been approved by senior management.   
It is important that while the wireless policy is being defined that it maintains 
consistency with DoT and FAA security policy for the general employee.  The level of 
authority and responsibility of the general employee must be defined as well.  For 
example, if the general employee will be allowed personal laptops on the wireless 
network, then the rules for laptops must be documented clearly within the security policy.  
Such rules might require that each personal laptop be single boot with Windows 2000 and 
later, Linux Red Hat 9 and later, etc, and all personal equipment must be brought into the 
IT department and MAC addresses and serial numbers recorded before the personal 
laptop will be allowed to use the FAA network.  Another option would be that wireless 
users will be chosen by the FAA, and government equipment will be the only equipment 
(access point and PCMCIA or PCI cards for wireless) accepted on the FAA wireless 
LAN.   
D. DETERMINE THE REQUIREMENTS 
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Once a general POA&M has been defined for an implementation requirements 
can be established.  The requirements will be used to guide design decisions and 
hardware selection.  An employee survey may be the most practical way to explore 
overall options for each phase.  A well developed survey could determine employee 
interest and partial physical requirements for a specific implementation.  For instance, a 
survey within a specific department for the prototype phase would reveal a fairly accurate 
number of personnel within the department wanting or needing to utilize wireless 
technology.   
An important requirement is to designate the physical location that requires 
coverage in each specific phase of wireless implementation.  It is also important at this 
point to begin putting boundaries on the requirements.  For instance, in order to cover an 
entire department during the first phase of implementation, the designated buildings must 
be completely wireless capable.  In addition, since it is a desire to minimize outside 
exposure the intent might be to keep the wireless AP propagation to within 100 feet of the 
building.  These requirements will be useful when calculating the physical equipment 
requirements.   
In addition, it is important to begin calculating the number of users expected and 
the predicted throughput for the first phase of implementation defined.  Scalability will be 
a later consideration, but look now at how many employees will be included within the 
first actual infrastructure implementation.  This gives a general design target.   
Finally, determine logical network requirements such as the number of IP 
addresses required to support the specific phase.  Establish the IP address and subnet 
mask that will represent the WLAN.  This range should include the only the IP addresses 
assigned to the wireless clients in order to track wireless clients separately from the 
general network hosts.   
E. THE RF SITE SURVEY 
The site survey is critical to the topographical design phase.  The site survey 
examines the physical layout of the office space and determines optimal placement and 
number of access points to maximize client connectivity and throughput.  Therefore, it is 
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necessary to perform a RF site survey to fully realize the behavior of RF within a facility 
before deploying wireless access points. 
Given the different propagation characteristics of the 802.11a and 802.11b/g this 
may require planning for coverage for 802.11a, then 802.11b/g and a financial 
comparison between the two types before one can be settled on.  It will also be necessary 
to research RF coverage information in order to determine number of APs required that 
will offer appropriate propagation coverage.  Since, RF propagations are different from 
building to building it may require actual field testing of intended equipment to determine 
adequate coverage within the buildings.  Often it is best to use the same vendor for APs 
and PCMCIA and PCI cards, but this is not a requirement.  Make sure to test with the 
same model APs and PCMCIA and PCI cards that are expected for the design. In other 
words, do not use a home network AP if the intent is to design to a commercial office AP.  
A possible software tool to assist with designing to the propagation requirements of a 
wireless network is the Proxim ORiNOCO Ekahau Wi-Fi Site Survey and Prediction 
Software from www.proxim.com. 
Before conducting the actual site field test survey, obtain a copy of the building 
layout and conduct a walkthrough of the building to ensure the copy of the layout is 
current and accurate.  Make sure to use the boundary requirement information gathered 
during the determination of requirements time frame.  This is a perfect opportunity to 
survey for required electrical and space cooling capabilities within the AP locations.  If 
the electrical and space cooling capacities of the existing facilities are inadequate it must 
be addressed and fixed before the installation stage.   
Once the FAA wireless team is satisfied with the AP locations and the RF 
coverage, the AP installation positions should be recorded on facility diagrams.  The 
signal readings and supported data rates should be included near the outer propagation 
boundary lines of each AP as a baseline for future redesign efforts.  Up through this point 
the APs will only be operated during propagation testing.  The site survey is only 
responsible for investigation of RF site hardware requirements. [28, 29] 
Lab testing the selected equipment will be conducted at this time to assist in 
solving additional site survey requirements such as throughput verification which can not 
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be addressed on the active network until an implementation design is accepted.  Overall, 
the site survey should answer the following points:   
• Locations APs are to be connected to the wired LAN.  
• Optimum placement of APs to provide the most efficient coverage and 
maximum throughput. 
• The number of APs sufficient to support the characteristics of the building 
with respect to radio waves (lab testing will assist with this).   
• Actual performance characteristics with respect to locations anticipated to 
have a large number of users (lab testing will assist with this).   
• The organization’s applications performance characteristics on the 
wireless LAN (lab testing will assist with this). [30] 
F. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The design stage produces a logical and consistent definition of how the wireless 
LAN will satisfy requirements.  At this point, specific equipment is selected from the site 
survey and lab testing results.  The actual implementation design will be formulated to 
include but not be limited to the site survey facility documentation and a topology map of 
the designed wireless network.  Several considerations must also be addressed within the 
design documentation.  These include interoperability, performance, scalability, and 
security as addressed here:   
Risks Assessments 
Thorough risk assessments are imperative to the development of a well-planned 
wireless implementation.  A true risk assessment requires several steps.  First, the 
vulnerabilities and threats must be identified, but that alone is not enough.  It is important 
the organization also investigate each threat or vulnerability for what possible damage the 
associated attack(s) would cause to the organization.  Additionally, each threat and 
vulnerability should have mitigation strategies developed and analyzed for cost.  Each 
threat and vulnerability should then be compared against probability of it happening and 
likely mitigation costs.   
A cost benefit analysis at this point will create a visible risk environment for the 
organization.  The organization can complete a true risk assessment and make sound 
decisions concerning operational security for the organization based on this information.  
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It is prudent for an organization to prepare documentation delineating each of these steps 
as it will represent the methodology behind sound security practices.     
Interoperability 
Although interoperability of wireless infrastructure is not generally an issue with 
Ethernet networks, WLAN systems are often vendor proprietary and do not always 
operate well in a mixed vendor environment.  In order to maximize interoperability with 
future design requirements, choose products with Wireless Ethernet Compatibility 
Alliance (WECA)’s Wi-Fi certification. “The Wi-Fi Alliance offers a Wi-Fi 
CERTIFIED* logo on products to show that they have been successfully tested as an 




The design should allow for flexibility and growth.  The FAA department size 
varies from region to region; the design should scale with the size of the department and 
the number of users.   
Security 
Assess the organization’s information sensitivity and security requirements for the 
separate categories of information.  Establish wireless security mechanisms based on the 
value of information that will transverse the wireless segments. [32] Wireless APs most 
often are not secure with factory default configurations and settings.  Document required 
security configurations and settings for APs during the design stage.  Table VI-1 lists the 
security combination of authentication and encryption methods available and a short 
description of the associated security strengths.  This table is provided as a high level 
reference guide.  It is suggested that the FAA determine what best meets the 
organization’s security protection level through more extensive research means.  
G. INSTALLATION AND USER REGISTRATION 
Once the requirements are determined and listed, a thorough site survey has been 
conducted, and the security infrastructure is in place, it is time to roll out the equipment 
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and begin the wireless program for a given phase.  The APs should be in place and 
operational.  If personal equipment is authorized on the LAN make sure that users 
accessing the network have properly registered the equipment.  If there is no personal 
equipment authorized on the network distribute the required hardware to authorized 
users.  It is important the IT department maintain records of registered users.  It is 
recommended that the IT department continues to monitor and conduct wireless network 
analysis as described in the next section in order to prevent and reduce chances of an 
attack.   
H. SECURITY MAINTENANCE OF THE WIRELESS NETWORK  
Once the wireless network is operational it is vitally important that the IT security 
administrators routinely test for general user compliance.  This step is by no means a 
trivial matter.  A major indication of noncompliance is unauthorized users on the 
network.   
In a wireless network it is important to test for unauthorized users from within the 
network as well as the propagation of unauthorized APs within the designated FAA 
footprint area.  Testing of the internal network for unauthorized users is best controlled 
through routine collection of network traffic logs and log examination by security 
administrators.  Testing for propagation of unauthorized APs requires security 
administrators to routinely scan for “hot spots” with propagation testing software.  
Another propagation test includes the routine monitoring of the broadcasted messages to 
verify the traffic is of expected nature. [23] For instance, it is important when a wireless 
LAN is invoking 802.1X that there be no “in the clear” traffic.  This would be an 
indication of a malfunctioning AP, or unauthorized AP.   
Table VI-2 provides a list of monitoring tools and vendors that may prove helpful 
for researching products for the FAA.  The inclusion of this information here does not 









EAP Needed? RADIUS Needed? 
Shared-key Static WEP No No 
 Remarks: Data security is not a primary concern.  Selected for ease of implementation 
over data security and authentication complexity.  Also good for guest networks and 
low security network 
MAC Address 
Filtering 
Optional Optional Optional 
 Remarks: MAC filtering is a separate authentication scheme that can be applied to any 
of the security combination already mentioned.  It adds a layer of security but also adds 
maintenance complexity. 
802.1X WEP Yes Yes 
 Remarks: Strong user authentication against a RAIDUS server and unique encryption 
keys are generated randomly for each user per session.  Require more overhead to 
setup, but offers good security.  Most client software and wireless network cards will 
support this method.  Complexity of rollout depends on EAP type selected 
Pre-Shared Key WPA No No 
 Remarks: Strong data encryption is provided through WPA using TKIP or AES.  
Generally used in smaller wireless deployments where authentication simplicity is 
desired over deployment of  RADIUS server and 802.1X clients. 
802.1X WPA Yes Yes 
 Remarks: Very strong security solution using a RADIUS server to authenticate each 
user and WPA with TKIP or AES to encrypt the data.  Client wireless network cards 
must support WPA and 802.1X clients and 802.1X compliant RADIUS server must be 
deployed.  Good for enterprise wireless LANs that require strong authentication of 
wireless users and strong data encryption.  Complexity of rollout depends on EAP type 
selected. 
 Table VI-1 Security Protocols [33] 
I. CONCLUSION 
It is important to understand that a wireless implementation is a major 
modification to any network.  Although wireless hardware can easily be selected and 
installed within any network, wireless technology generally introduces greater security 
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risks.  Therefore, a clear, well planned rollout process is required to introduce wireless 
technology in a controlled, systematic manner in order to mitigate these security risks.  
Network Discovery Tools   
Boingo Hot Spot Finder (PC, PDA) www.boingo.com 
BSD AirTools (BSD) www.dachdb0den.com/projects/bsd-
airtools.html 
Kismet (several OS) www.kismetwireless.net 
MacStumbler (Mac OS X) www.macstumbler.com 
NetStumbler (PC) MiniStumbler (PDA) www.netstumbler.com 
WaveStumbler (Linux) www.cqure.net 
WLAN Analyzers 
AirMagnet www.airmagnet.com 
AirScanner Mobile Sniffer (freeware) www.airscanner.com 
Ethereal www.ethereal.com 
Fluke Networks WaveRunner www.flukenetworks.com 
Network Instruments Network Observer www.networkinstruments.com 
Network Associates Sniffer Wireless www.sniffer.com 
WildPackets AiroPeek NX www.wildpackets.com 
Table VI-2 WLAN Monitoring Tools 
It is most important that leadership maintain overall accountability for the 
implementation process and put forward the required resources associated with the 
development of a wireless implementation plan.  The steps offered here are generic in 
nature due to the complexity of a large organization’s requirements.  It is important that 
the organization designate internal personnel to guide the implementation process in an 
approach relevant to specific executive requirements.   
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In addition to the resource allocation from senior management, it is suggested that 
an internal team of employees be selected and empowered by senior management to 
make use of these steps for the development and execution of the organization’s wireless 
implementation plan.  An internal team of personnel skilled in IT security, the 
organization’s network, and internal managerial practices will be best able to develop a 
pertinent wireless implementation plan.  The development of a written implementation 
POA&M can suffice as a logical and comprehensive methodology for each phase of 
implementation for wireless technology within the establishment.    
Wireless technology offers a level of freedom to users that greatly increases 
flexibility over normal networks, yet it requires greater implementation planning and 
increased network examination after installation.  By following the methodology offered 
here a large organization can develop an implementation plan that directly supports user 
requests for wireless connectivity while maintaining an elevated level of network security 
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APPENDIX 1. AN EXAMPLE DESIGN FOR A SECURE WIRELESS 
LAN  
The purpose of this appendix is to provide an exemplar design for a secure wireless local 
area network (WLAN).  The design will address the WLAN topology, select the appropriate 
802.11 standards and define a strong security method.  For this example, we will assume there is 
a requirement to support two APs and ten mobile devices with considerable throughput. 
The WLAN Topology 
The WLAN topology should be simple and flexible to allow for future growth.  For 
illustration, Figure 1-1 shows a generic wireless topology consisting of a client, an AP, a switch, 
a gateway, a firewall, a router, and authentication servers.   The gateway provides an initial line 
of protection to the internal wired network by separating the wireless network from the wired 
network.  The servers are responsible for the authentication process through the utilization of 
certificates.  The switch prevents access to the internal wired network by wireless clients until 
the authentication is successful.  We will build further on this topology for our exemplar design.   
 
Figure 1-1 A Generic Wireless Topology 
 
Selecting the Appropriate IEEE 802.11 Standard 
There are three IEEE 802.11 standards to be considered when selecting wireless 
broadcast devices: IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.1a, and IEEE 802.11g.  Table 1-1 briefly outlines 
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the IEEE 802.11 b/a/g maximum throughput and number of channels available from each 
standard to assist in the selection of the best IEEE 802.11 standard for the design.   
IEEE Standard Frequency Maximum Throughput 
Non-over lapping 
channels 
802.11b 2.4GHz 11Mbps 3 
802.11a 5GHz 54Mbps 12 
802.11g 2.4GHz 54Mbps 3 
Table 1-1 IEEE 802.11 Standard Comparisons [7] 
It is important to also consider the range of devices when selecting a standard.  Although 
IEEE 802.11a provides a high throughput of 54Mbps at 5GHz it is not necessarily the best 
choice in all situations.  In order to realize the maximum throughput for the 802.11a (54 Mbps) 
the AP must be within 10 -15 meters of the host station.  On the other hand, the 802.11b device 
has a maximum low throughput range (1 Mbps) of 500 meters.  If the requirement is for many 
users within a closed in area the 802.11a may prove more functional, but if the users cover a 
large footprint, and do not require large bandwidth, the 802.11b may be best. [34]  
802.11g was ratified in 2003 and provides a throughput of 54Mbps at 2.4 GHz.  
Dissimilar to the 802.11b, the 802.11g is capable of utilizing the same OFDM waveform as the 
802.11a.  Side by side testing of the OFDM waveform with the 802.11a and 802.11g has shown 
that the 802.11g “is capable of higher data rates at longer ranges than any competing WLAN 
technology.” [35] The 802.11g is gaining momentum as a popular alternative to the 802.11a and 
802.11b.   
Additionally, if scalability is an important consideration the non-over lapping channels of 
802.11a may be more appealing than throughput versus distance.  Since this exemplar does not 
define the client wireless network cards standard, the APs for this exemplar will have dual-mode 
frequencies (2.4GHz and 5 GHz) capabilities to support all users.   
Security Methods 
Early wireless technology offered WEP as the only means of wireless security.  Yet, over 
time WEP has proven principally insecure.  Within the past few years introduction of the WPA 
2002 standard has significantly increased the WEP security.  WPA, commercially available 
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today, is compatible with 802.11a, b, and g and is actually is a subset of 802.11i.  WPA is a 
specification of standards-based, interoperable security enhancements that increases the level of 
data protection (encryption) and access control (authentication) for existing wireless LAN 
systems.  WPA includes 802.1X Authentication which is an essential element of network 
security in a wireless capable network.  Figure 1-2 shows the basic setup of an 802.1X network. 
Future systems based on IEEE 802.11i will provide the most secure wireless design to 
date.  The WPA standard of 2002 enhances the mechanisms of existing WEP by changing to 
temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP) but maintains the underlying security algorithm, RC4, 
established with WEP.  On the other hand, 802.11i modifies both the underlying security 
algorithm to EAS and the security protocol to counter mode cipher-block-chaining message 
authentication code protocol (CCMP), thus requiring complete redesign of wireless equipment.  
Although the IEEE 802.11i CCMP will improve security in the future, it is not available on the 
market today.   
   
Figure 1-2 IEEE 802.1X Technology [36] 
 
Security Selections 
802.1X uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and a RADIUS Server for 
network access control, see Figure 1-2 IEEE 802.1X Technology.  EAP-TLS is selected for use 
as it offers a robust solution for security.  In order to use 802.1X and EAP-TLS, the following 
components are required [37]:  
• Client wireless cards compatible with 802.1X (for authentication) 
• Client access software capable of EAP-TLS (for encryption) 
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• Wireless AP compatible with 802.1X and EAP-TLS (for authentication and 
encryption) 
• RADIUS compatible with EAP-TLS (for encryption) 
• Public key Infrastructure (PKI) (for authentication and encryption)  
Most add on wireless cards support 802.1X and can be used in the context of the 
Windows XP operating system.  Some laptop vendors even have integrated wireless support for 
802.1X and EAP-TLS.  For client access software, again the Windows XP operating system 
supports EAP-TLS.  Only industrial-grade APs support 802.1X and EAP-TLS.  Those APs cost 
more than the small office and home office grade systems but they offer superior features 
including Dynamic WEP, better quality antennas, and dual-band 802.11a, 802.11b and 802.11g.  
Both the 2000 and 2003 versions of Microsoft Server have RADIUS capabilities that support 
EAP-TLS and Certificate Authority services in a support PKI. 
A. Topology 
Figure 1-3 illustrates a topology with WPA standards and protocols implemented to 
provide a secure wireless LAN.  This small and flexible topology is extensible and allows for 
expansion as needed by a particular organization.   
The exemplar topology includes 10 laptops configured with the Windows XP Operating 
System and ten dual band wireless network cards that will communicate with the two APs.  The 
dual-band APs allow interoperability with the users’ different standards and yet provide a 
continuous connection with high throughput.   
Microsoft Windows XP operating system installed on the laptops supports 802.1X 
authentication and the wireless cards support EAP-TLS for strong mutual authentication of client 
and RADIUS Server and dynamic key encryption.  For identification, the users must obtain a 
private key and a public key digital certificate that has been securely distributed to the 
LDAP/RADIUS server. The WLAN utilizes WPA security standard that requires mutual 




Figure 1-3 Exemplar WLAN Architecture [37] 
 
The two APs are connected to a switch that is also connected to a gateway.  The gateway 
protects the internal network in case the wireless side undergoes technical failure, this will allow 
the internal network to function and continue to support day-to-day operation.  A firewall, 
another layer of defense, is also added to protect the internal network.  Several servers are to 
provide PKI authentication and act as a Certificate Authority for the PKI infrastructure.   
The wireless users who desire to connect to the network must provide their public key 
certificate to the Certificate Authority, and register their laptops with the IT department. Once 
their laptops are registered and the Certificate Authority server contains their certificate, they are 
ready to wirelessly connect to the net.  Implementation of WPA is the best WLAN security until 
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